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Fragile Watermarking Based on Encoding
of the Zeroes of the -Transform
Anthony T. S. Ho, Xunzhan Zhu, Jun Shen, and Pina Marziliano
Abstract—In this paper, a new fragile watermarking method for digital
image authentication is proposed based on the zero locations of the -trans-
form. The -transform domain is a new transform space for fragile water-
mark embedding. Our watermarking method is designed by exploiting the
sensitivity of the positions of the zeroes of the -transform around the unit
circle to any change made on the host image. The watermarking system can
localize the portions of a watermarked image that have been tampered with
with high accuracy. In addition, the newly proposed scheme is more secure
than normal least-significant bits-based fragile watermarking techniques.
Experimental results as well as the theoretical analysis demonstrated the
fragility and accuracy of the new method.
Index Terms—Authentication, fragile watermarking, z-transform.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital image authentication is increasingly becoming more impor-
tant with the tremendous development of the Internet. The ability of
fragile watermarking to detect changes in the watermarked image to
provide authenticity and integrity of the image makes it go a long way
toward solving the image authentication problem.
In contrast to a semifragile watermark [1], [2], which only seeks to
detect a predefined set of illegitimate distortions to the host image, a
fragile watermark is designed to detect any change to the host image.
Hence, a variety of fragile watermarking methods has been proposed by
embedding identifying information in the least-significant bits (LSBs)
of the image [3]–[6]. Unfortunately, these methods are somewhat unse-
cured as the use of LSBs could be easily detected and manipulated. In
[7], a fragile watermarking scheme using a statistical model was pro-
posed. However, the scheme was only able to localize distorted pixels
altered in the five most significant bits. In our work, we propose a novel
fragile watermarking scheme in the z-transform domain. The z-trans-
form is a convenient yet invaluable tool for representing, analyzing,
and designing discrete-time signals and systems [8]–[10]. However, to
our knowledge, this is the first time that this transform has been applied
to digital watermarking. The locations of zeroes of the z-transform are
very susceptible to any pixel value change. It has the advantage of easy
implementation and pixel-wise sensitivity to external tampering. More-
over, it provides better data-hiding security protection than the normal
LSBs check-sum fragile watermarking techniques.
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II. ZEROES OF z-TRANSFORM
Theorem: Assume that f [n], n = 0; 1; . . . ; N  1 is a non-negative
real sequence which is not uniformly zero. Then, the z-transform of
f [n] must have negative real root(s) if f [0] 6= 0, f [N   1] 6= 0, and
N are even.
Proof: By the definition of z-transform [10]
F (z) =
N 1
n=0
f [n]z n =
A
zN 1
N 1
i=1
(z   zi): (1)
From (1), it can be concluded that fzigmust either be real or occur in
conjugate pairs to ensure that the coefficients f [n] are real. Meanwhile,
since f [0] 6= 0 and f [N   1] 6= 0, the z-transform series has an even
number of items. Therefore, the total number of roots should be odd. It
follows that there is at least one real root. Consider zpr , which is a root
of F (z) such that it is real and positive. Then, we have
F (z)
z=z
=
N 1
n=0
f [n](zpr)
n = 0:
Since f [n] is nonnegative, we have
f [n] = 08 n
which contradicts the hypotheses that the sequence is not uniformly
zero.
In conclusion, F (z) must have real root(s), and this (these) real
root(s) can only be negative. Moreover, most of the negative real ze-
roes are distributed in the neighborhood of the unit circle.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
The diagram of the algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 1. The original
imageX is divided into nonoverlapping blocks of size N N , where
N is an even positive integer. By viewing it row by row, each block can
be expressed as a sequence of vectors fxmg, m = 0; 1; . . . ; N   1,
where xm = fxm[n]g, n = 0; 1; . . . ; N   1. We then perform the
z-transform and obtain the zeroes, which are denoted as fzm;ig, i =
1; . . . ; N   1, and m = 0; . . . ; N   1.
We embed the watermark w by slightly perturbing the locations of
the zeroes, where w is a binary sequence of N . The watermark bits
are randomly generated and the initial seed number is contained in a
secret key file. A watermark signal of N bits long is embedded into
every block, that is, one bit is embedded into every vector. To avoid the
complex number computation, we embed the authentication watermark
by slightly modifying the modulus of negative real zeroes, which are
denoted by znr . As proven in Section II, since N is even, which is
the case under most circumstances for natural images, there must be at
least one real negative zero in the zero set of a pixel vector. Besides the
negative real zero, there are (N=2) 1 pairs of complex zeroes for every
vector (the number of complex zeroes would be less if multiple negative
real zeroes exist). Consider the vectorxm and denoteVm as the number
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Fig. 1. Fragile watermarking. (a) Watermark embedding. (b) Image authentication.
of associated complex zeroes with phase angle  2 (0; (=2)], and
letting K be a user defined key, we have
h = H(K;V0; V1; . . . ; VN 1) (2)
whereH is a hash function andh is theN bits output. We then compute
p = w  h (3)
where  is the exclusive OR function. The watermarking is performed
by embedding p into the negative real zeroes. The data-hiding process
is defined as follows:
z0nr =
 1 + 1:5+ U(znr + 1)(0:5); if p = 1
 1  1:5  U( znr   1)(0:5); if p = 0
(4)
where
U(t) =
1; if t  0
0; if t < 0
znr; z
0
nr 2
  are the original and the watermarked zeros, respec-
tively, and 0 <  < 0:1. The small positive offset  determines the
tradeoff between the fragility of the watermarking scheme and the
quality of the watermarked image.
After the watermark embedding process, we transform the zeroes
back to the sequence using the inverse z-transform. We then obtain an-
other vector x0m, which is slightly different from the one before water-
marking. By applying the aforementioned process to all of the relevant
blocks, we obtain the watermarked image Y.
In the authentication process, we need the watermarked image and
the secret key to identify the watermark. Let the watermarked image
after passing through variant communication channels be Y^. The wa-
termark sequence w is generated using the initial state number con-
tained in the key. The authentication process also starts by dividing the
image into small blocks of size N  N . In every block, by applying
the z-transform to every row, we obtain the zeroes. We find the values
of fVmg and compute h = H(K;V0; V1; . . . ; VN 1). We then obtain
p by (3). The negative real zeroes fz^nrg are compared to the bits of p
based on the following conditions:
Rm =
1; if (z^nr >  1 + &p = 1) _ (z^nr <  1  &p = 0)
0; otherwise
(5)
where _ is an OR function and Rm is a Boolean variable which in-
dicates the authenticity of the pixel vector xm, m = 0; . . . ; N   1.
Fig. 2. Experimental results. (a) Original images. (b) Watermarked image. (c)
Tampered image. (d) Difference image between the tampered image and the
watermarked image. (e) The authentication result.
Rm = 0 represents the altered regions while Rm = 1 represents in-
tact areas. The authenticity of a block can be indicated by
R = R0 _R1 _    _RN 1: (6)
After checking all of the image blocks, the tampered parts are located
to determine the authenticity of the input image.
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed
method with experimental results, followed by the performance anal-
ysis of the method.
A. Experimental Results
In our experiment, we set  = 0:02. We used gray-scale image Fin-
gerprint as shown in Fig. 2(a) to test our authentication algorithm. A
block size of 8 8 was used, which is commonly used in image-pro-
cessing applications. The watermarked image is displayed in Fig. 2(b).
We shall see that the watermarked image looks identical to the orig-
inal image, with a peak-to-signal noise ratio (PSNR) value of approxi-
mately 45 dB. As shown in Fig. 2(c) and (d), a small part of the finger-
print image was modified. The authentication result by our algorithm
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Fig. 3. Offset of the modulus of negative real zeroes caused by one gray-scale
value change.
is shown in Fig. 2(e) and we can observe that the tampered area was
accurately detected.
B. Fragility of Watermark to Pixel Perturbation
From our observation, the zero locations of the z-transform are very
sensitive to the value change of even a single pixel, which renders the
z-transform domain ideal for fragile watermarking. We have investi-
gated this property experimentally. We collected 1000 gray-scale nat-
ural images and calculated the negative real zeroes of the z-transform
of their pixel sequences as described in Section III. We then randomly
changed one pixel value in every sequence and calculated the ampli-
tudes of the offsets of the negative real zeroes, which are reported in
Fig. 3. It can be observed that even a single pixel’s change unavoidably
disturbs the zero locations. In addition, we found that 98% of the neg-
ative real zeroes tend to shift toward the unit circle and as illustrated in
Fig. 3, the distribution peaks at an offset of 0.18, which is enough to
change the watermark detection results.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we discuss a novel fragile watermarking method based
on the z-transform domain. The watermark bits are embedded by slight
perturbation of the zero locations. The zeroes of the z-transform around
the unit circle are very sensitive to any change of the host image. This
important property provides the scheme with special sensitivity to any
alteration to the watermarked image and the ability of accurate local-
izing. In addition, the proposed method is more secure than normal
fragile watermarking techniques based on LSB embedding. Simulation
results confirmed the applicability of the proposed algorithm.
REFERENCES
[1] C.-S. Lu and M. H.-Y. Liao, “Multipurpose watermarking for image
authentication and protection,” IEEE Trans. Image Process., vol. 10,
no. 10, pp. 1579–1592, Oct. 2001.
[2] A. T. S. Ho, X. Zhu, and Y. L. Guan, “Image content authentication
using pinned sine transform,” EURASIP J. Appl. Signal Process., Spe-
cial Issue Multimedia Security Rights Manag., vol. 2004, no. 14, pp.
2174–2184, Oct. 2004.
[3] M. Yeung and F. Mintzer, “An invisible watermarking technique for
image verification,” in Proc. Int. Conf. Image Processing, Santa Bar-
bara, CA, Oct. 1997, vol. 2, pp. 680–683.
[4] P. W. Wong, “A watermark for image integrity and ownership verifi-
cation,” presented at the IS & T PIC Conf., Portland, OR, May 1998.
[5] P. W. Wong, “A public key watermark for image verification and au-
thentication,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Image Processing, 1998, vol. 1,
pp. 455–459.
[6] M. U. Celik, G. Sharma, E. Saber, and A. M. Tekalp, “Hierarchical
watermarking for secure image authentication with localization,” IEEE
Trans. Image Process., vol. 11, no. 6, pp. 585–595, Jun. 2002.
[7] X. Zhang and S. Wang, “Statistical fragile watermarking capable of
locating individual tampered pixels,” IEEE Signal Process. Lett., vol.
14, no. 10, pp. 727–730, Oct. 2007.
[8] E. C. Ifeachor and B. W. Jervis, Digital Signal Processing: A Practical
Approach. Wokingham, U.K.: Addison-Wesley, 1993.
[9] R. H. T. Bates, B. K. Quek, and C. R. Parker, “Some implications of
zero sheets for blind deconvolution and phase retrieval,” J. Opt. Soc.
Amer. A, Opt. Image Sci.., vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 468–479, Mar. 1990.
[10] R. Vich, z-Transform Theory and Applications. Dordrecht, The
Netherlands: Reidel, 1987.
On the Assumption of Equal Contributions
in Fingerprinting
Hans Georg Schaathun
Abstract—With a digital fingerprinting scheme, a vendor of digital copies
of copyrighted material marks each individual copy with a unique finger-
print. If an illegal copy appears, it can be traced back to one or more guilty
pirates due to this fingerprint. A coalition of pirates may combine their
copies to produce an unauthorized copy with a false, hybrid fingerprint.
It is often assumed in the literature that the members of the collusion will
make equal contributions to the hybrid fingerprint, because nobody will
accept an increased risk of being caught. We argue that no such assump-
tion is valid a priori, and we show that a published solution by Sebé and
Domingo–Ferrer can be broken by breaking the assumption.
Index Terms—Collusion-attack, collusion-secure code (CSC), digital fin-
gerprinting, scattering codes.
I. BACKGROUND
The problem of digital fingerprinting was introduced in [1] and has
received quite some attention following [2]. A vendor of digital copies
of copyrighted material wants to prevent unauthorized copying. Digital
fingerprinting makes it possible to trace the guilty user (pirate) when an
illegal copy is found. This is done by embedding a secret identification
mark (fingerprint) in each copy, making every copy unique.
Typically, a robust watermarking (WM) scheme is used to hide the
fingerprint in the file. WM schemes are designed to hide any message in
a file in such a way that they can be recovered, even after being subject
to noise, signal-processing operations, or even malicious attacks.
If a single pirate distributes unauthorized copies, they will carry his
or her fingerprint. If the vendor discovers the illegal copies, he or she
can trace them back to the pirate and prosecute him or her. However,
a collusion of users can compare their copies, and thereby find regions
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